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Introduction U.S. Army participation in the Afghanistan conflict is beginning to draw down.
With deployments reducing from a high of nearly 100,000 Soldiers to numbers ranging from 9000 to no forces deployed to Afghanistan, the US Army is left without specific missions or near term threats. Indicators from senior military leaders as well as respected think tanks with national security watchers such as LTG David Barno (R) and
Michael O'Hanlon believe that the planned reduction of Army active duty end strength from 535,000 to 490,000 could be only the first resizing effort in the Army. Additional resizing and restructure of the active army's forces structure may be required to address budget concerns and allow Department of Defense (DOD) to reallocate funds to other programs designed to address future threats. In addition to budget concerns, the United States strategic direction has subtly shifted to increase regional involvement in shaping the security environment during peace time. The increased emphasis in building partner capacity to enable our regional allies and partner countries is a prevalent theme in DOD's strategy. This paper will examine the Army's current capacity building concept, Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), which utilizes units in the general purpose force to support combatant commanders and offer recommendations to slightly modify in the active component (AC) force structure to enable those RAF units achieve the combatant commander's theater engagement objectives (steady-state activities). Further this paper will argue that the recommended force structure changes will also allow the Army to preserve critical leadership capacity and training resources if the declining budget 2 environment. To begin this analysis it is helpful to understand how the Army's recent force structure was developed.
Background
Resizing the Army to achieve a "peace dividend" after conflict is nothing new in the United States. Resizing has occurred after every major conflict in our history. Most recently, after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the dominant threat and the stunning victory during Desert Storm, US forces were significantly reduced. During the 1990's, domestic fiscal pressures caused the congress to question how the Department of Defense determined its required budget and force structure to meet national security requirements. The Congress used the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 1997 to require the Department of Defense to produce a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR was implemented to force a "comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, forces structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan and other elements of the defense program." The panel members felt that "this threat construct may have become a force-protection mechanism --a means of justifying the current force structure --especially for those 3 searching for the certainties of the Cold War." 4 Further they contested that the two regional theater construct did little to address of other future challenges and threats in the homeland from asymmetric threats, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
QDR 2001 attempted to address the panel's critique and a more "nuanced strategic paradigm, abbreviated as 1-4-2-1" was developed." 5 The "1" represented the defense of the homeland and defense support to civil authority; while the "4" indicated the requirement to deter aggression with forward presence in Europe, Northeast Asia (Korea), East Asian littorals, and the Middle-East (Iraq). The "2" provided the requirement to fight in two regional conflicts with the last "1" describing a general notion of a decisive victory in one regional conflict with regime change or occupation. QDR 2001 directed that force structure planning and changes "serve as a bridge" to from 1997 QDRs two Major Theaters of War (MTW) concept to the new 1-4-2-1 concept. 6 Before these forces structure changes could be fully analyzed and implemented, the 9-11 attacks occurred. Faced with managing a conflict in Afghanistan and soon another in Iraq, the focus on forces structure changes to meet future challenges of 2020 diminished. In force structure terms, the 9-11 attacks preserved the Army.
The conflicts in "Iraq and Afghanistan dominated" QDR 2005. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan required significant ground forces. 7 The Army began to modify its forces structure to the BCT configuration to rapidly generate combat power. This force structure change was enabled by a temporary increase of 30,000 personnel supported in the QDR. This increase provided the personnel space need to adjust force structure and build new brigades to support the rotation policy and reset timelines. Further, the Recent Guidance QDR 2010 continued with QDR 2001s strategy of 1-4-2-1 but acknowledged two key differences as it relates force design. First, the QDR 2010 clearly identified that DOD role in the homeland "will almost always be in a supporting role" and provided direct guidance to establish capabilities primarily in the National Guard to support other lead federal agencies and governors to respond to WMD events in the U.S. 10 Secondly, the 2010 QDR calls for improvements six areas. Though 2010 QDR established an optimized force level for each of the services, it "does not endorse any easily summarized set of metrics for determining the size and makeup of the force" as the demands of the current war diminishes. 11 It specifically provides a caveat that diminishing demands in Afghanistan would allow further review of force structure and other resource changes.
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Regardless of force sizing, the 2010 QDR clearly emphasizes "building the security capacity of partnered states" as a major objective. 12 The 2010 QDRs shift to "helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security" directly reflects the National Security Strategy goal to share both the burden and cost of global security with our partnered nations. 13 Their increase capacity would allow the United States address its own fiscal concerns while maintaining a leading role on the global stage. Effectively, building partner capacity (BPC) in "4" regions enables US deterrence as the second priority in the 1-4-2-1 strategic paradigm.
In January 2012, the Joint Operation Access Concept (JOAC) was published. It highlighted Air-Sea battle as the focal component to maintain freedom of action through the global commons that include international airspace and sea shipping land as well as the ability to utilize space platforms and cyberspace. U.S. BPC engagements could prove invaluable in providing the necessary access to conduct contingency operations in a region or to increase our operational reach into a contingency area.
Investments in technology to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) weapons from long range threats will add additional fiscal pressure to the defense budget. The Department of Defense will have to make tough trade-off to achieve the savings required to invest in this technology. Additional forces structure cuts offer to be an attractive method these cost savings. Much like in 1997 when the Army was targeted for reduction to pay for technology advances to maintain our advantage, the Army force structure could be targeted again. Fortunately the JOAC also recognizes the need for land forces and states "maintaining and expanding operational access may 6 require entry of land forces into hostile territory for a number of reasons." 14 These reasons range from raids to destroy of anti-access/area denial capabilities influencing our naval and air forces, establishing a lodgment for ground operations, to providing logistical base to expand the operational reach of our air and naval forces all ensure that land forces certainly will maintain operational missions as part of the JOAC, but they could require relatively small and specialized forces. 
Service Solutions
The Marine Corps describes this new focus on building partner capacity as setting the "conditions that relieve U.S. forces of the requirement to engage in combat actions." 18 By "building of partner nation capacity (BPC) … with our allies throughout the world will provide the design required to achieve our desired ends." Again, the Marine concept is similar to the Army's RAF concept and uses similar methods to cross attached low density forces not assigned organically to a BCT. Where the two concepts diverge is in the regional specialist assigned to the Marine organization to help achieve 'regional understanding.'
The SC-MAGTF is supplemented with "coded... billets that facilitate the assignment of foreign area officers (FAO), regional affairs officers (RAO), linguists, and other personnel with regional expertise." 26 These additional specialized functions assist the SC-MAGTF to better understand the complex issues that the partner nation's armed forces face. This understanding enables them to develop a more robust BPC program and execute training with culturally astuteness. As currently constructed no added 'regional expertise' is planned for our regionally aligned forces, instead the Army concept calls for additional training for the Soldiers assigned to build their regional expertise. This broad training will be costly and difficult to manage while maintaining high level of readiness at the decisive level. The Army needs to develop a solution to provide that capability to the general purpose units assigned this mission while balancing costs.
An Alternate Solution
The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 stresses that Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept requires units to have specific region language capabilities, cultural awareness, and discreet training to operate effectively on building partner capacity. To build these specialized skills, the Army has several options; most are costly in training dollars or force structure. Given the current forces structure pressures and the potential for additional reduction, the low cost viable option is to make a modest change in structure to build a 'plug and play' element to bridge the operational gap between the combatant commander's security cooperation requirements and the general purpose force's extant structure. For clarity in this paper, I will designate this organization, the Capacity Building Unit (CBU) that "we will have units that will train to certain levels and then, as they get requirements from combatant commanders, they will train and be capable of conducting operations in those areas of-for that specific combatant commander." 27 What is not outlined in that Stationing forward with the ASCC, the CBU can utilize the ASCC administrative HQs to mitigate growth. As modest force structure redesign, the CBU adds to and compliments the RAF concept and meets the SECDEF intent to "whenever possible…develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives." (Figures 3 and 4) . 34 
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Pre-Decisional Draft In the current concept, RAFs forces focus their CONUS training efforts in on their core skills so that, as the CSA states, we have "units that are capable in their specialty.
[W]e wants infantrymen training infantrymen." 36 This foundational training builds the ability to conduct their mission across the range of military operations. Individual training, small unit maneuver training, company training are essential to either a capacity building mission or a contingency operation. Regional aligned forces internal training would ideally achieve a decisive action level of training level to ensure availability in case of an emerging contingency. Following completion of this training, additional training would focus on advising skills and some regional training. This would be the role of the 162nd ITB.
The 162nd Brigade's current mission is to "train advisor skills, combat skills, and security force assistance skills to provide the Army and the Joint Forces Commanders with trained personnel and units to build partner nation security capacity." 37 Its current training mission is focused on providing adequately trained individual combat advisors to units in Afghanistan, but as the mission statement implies, the 162nd could provide
Regionally Aligned forces additional training to support a BPC deployment. Their role would be to provide advisor training to the unit leadership and conduct company-lanes in mission-rehearsal type exercises to confirm the readiness of the unit.
The CSA's vision calls for aligning brigades based on the combatant commanders request in some "region(s), it might be one; in some, it could be four, five or six" regionally aligned brigades. 38 The 
Reversibility
Secretary of Defense Panetta instructed the service to begin to look at the concept of reversibility and reduce "the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force." 39 In the chairman's guidance to the force, he also highlight that he "anticipate(s) a new evaluation of risk. Today's troubled political economy is elevating the relevance of cost and reality of financial risk." 40 His guidance was to "anticipate shrinking forces" and that any cuts would not be equitable but rather targeted to create a flexible versatile joint force.
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Center for New American Security (CNAS) offered 3 active component end strength scenarios below the anticipated 490,000 to produce cost savings (Table 1) . Reversibility has become a key force structure planning factor to prepare for reduce our operational risk. Structure changes and personnel policies to retain middle level operationally trained officer and NCOs in the event of a large scale contingency or the rapid rise of a near peer competitor that threatens our national interests is impetrative the current force structure planning. The Army has already begun to make some personnel assignment changes to retain this middle level talent and experience by reducing specialization in discreet fields.
In congressional testimony on personnel matter, LTG Thomas Bostick as the Army G-1 testified that "placing more noncommissioned officers in drill sergeant status and in recruiting will enable the Army to reverse and ramp up more quickly if it needs to for an emergency." 43 He stated that "placing mid-grade officers and mid-grade noncommissioned officers in the institutional Army would provide some flexibility to grow the Army." 44 Similar to the changes in the institutional Army structure, the CBU force structure provides the Army's added capacity to rapidly reverse downsizing.
CBUs not only provide an opportunity to retain the rank structure, skill sets, and depth of experience to rapidly expand, it also provides a broadening experience for midgrade leaders. CBUs provides assigned personnel additional regional, cultural and language experience they can apply in their future operational assignments while providing useful insights into higher level headquarters, joint operations and relationships between Army operations and the strategic goals.
Managing Risk
Building a CBU force structure contributes to the Army's ability to manage risk.
The defense risk management framework provides an approved framework to discuss risk mitigation. Operational Risk is "the ability of the current force to execute strategy successfully with acceptable … costs." 45 A small specialized capacity building unit support and enhances the Army's general purpose forces ability to conduct BPC operations by providing specialty skills and planning through the ASCC that support the training and deployment of the regionally aligned force at a potentially lower cost than training each regionally aligned brigade to a level needed to properly execute this strategy. It also enables the Army operational concept for "sustained cooperation" by coordinating with host nations and the country teams. " 46 Force structure risk consists of the ability to recruit, retain, train, educate and equip the army to conduct operations across the range of military operations. In the recently published Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013, the intent is that "all units will train to combined arms proficiency, and develop regional and cultural expertise in support of regional alignment." 47 Regionally aligned forces ability to allocate time and training to focus on developing a higher state of readiness for contingency operations could be enhanced if they could rely on ASCC and the associated CBU to coordinate, develop mission specific regional training, and assist deploying units assigned to build partner capacity.
Institutional risk is "the capacity of management and business practices to plan for, enable, and support the execution of DOD missions." 48 A small CBU regionally trained allows the Army to limit the depth of regional specialized training in language and culture required in the general purpose regionally aligned forces. The CBUs specialization limits to scope of intense specialization to a manageable and affordable size.
Future risk is the ability to "execute further missions successfully, and hedge against shocks." 49 "In the domestic context, political risks relates to the public support of national strategic priorities and associated resource requirements." 
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Army needs to develop a CBU structure functionally designed to bridge the gap from the general purpose forces conducting BPC operations and the combatant command. Currently, the Army faces few choices to meet overall force sizing requirements through FY 19 that makes finding the 200 spaces to build five CBUs easy to do. However, the pay-off in steady-state operations is too great not to seriously consider this force structure option to build this AC force. Several options exist.
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One option is to use spaces already in the 162d Brigade. 175 spaces were However, until the headquarters review is completed and headquarters roles refined, the ASCC CCPs remains the only deployable Army HQs capability actually assigned to all GCCs and available for immediate use. Transferring some additional operational capability to the RC or converting division, corps and ASCC headquarters staff to multi-component units is another alternative that should be explored to provide the force structure space to build CBU-like organizations.
Regardless of the force structure trade-off the Army chooses or the final design construct chosen, building a Capacity Building Unit at the ASCC is necessary to properly enable our BPC strategy with regionally aligned forces to work at a low cost.
AFRICOM is slated to receive the pilot regionally aligned force in FY 13.
Building a pilot CBU for AFRICOM provides an ideal opportunity with low risk to test the concept and refine the structure to employ in the other combatant commands in the future.
Endnotes
